India's Nuclear Command Authority Has Two Councils, and the Government's Statement of 4 January 2003 Says Only the Political Council Chaired by the Prime Minister Can Authorise Use of Nuclear Weapons

India’s government has said in writing, since 4 January 2003, who can order a nuclear strike: the Political Council of the Nuclear Command Authority, which the Prime Minister chairs. Released that day after a meeting of the Cabinet Committee on Security, the statement calls it “the sole body which can authorize the use of nuclear weapons.”

That sentence is most of what the government has published about the chain of command. This article sets out what the 2003 statement says, what the Constitution adds, who else sits in the structure according to the Defence Ministry’s own handbook, where the official texts are worded differently, and what has never been published.

What the 4 January 2003 statement says

On 4 January 2003 the Cabinet Committee on Security (CCS), the Cabinet’s top committee for defence and internal security, met to review progress in “operationalizing” India’s nuclear doctrine. It decided what to share with the public, and the statement lists eight points of doctrine. One reads: “Nuclear retaliatory attacks can only be authorised by the civilian political leadership through the Nuclear Command Authority.” Among the others, a credible minimum deterrent and no first use (using nuclear weapons only in retaliation) are covered in the account of the Pokhran tests and the doctrine.

Two short paragraphs then describe the Nuclear Command Authority (NCA). It has a Political Council, chaired by the Prime Minister, and an Executive Council, chaired by the National Security Adviser, the senior official who advises the Prime Minister on security. The Executive Council “provides inputs for decision making by the Nuclear Command Authority and executes the directives given to it by the Political Council.”

According to the statement, the CCS also reviewed the command and control structures, the state of readiness, the targeting strategy for a retaliatory attack and the operating procedures for the various stages of alert and launch, and it expressed satisfaction with the overall preparedness. The committee approved the appointment of a Commander-in-Chief of the Strategic Forces Command, to manage and administer all Strategic Forces. Arrangements for alternate chains of command for retaliatory strikes “in all eventualities” were approved as well.

Kerry Boyd reported in Arms Control Today that this was the first time since 1998 that India had publicly announced a formal nuclear command structure under civilian control.

What the Constitution says about defence and atomic energy

Under Article 394 the Constitution came into force on 26 January 1950. In the Seventh Schedule it lists “Defence of India and every part thereof including preparation for defence” as entry 1 of the Union List, and “Atomic energy and mineral resources necessary for its production” as entry 6. Article 246(1) gives Parliament exclusive power to make laws on Union List matters, so neither subject is open to state legislatures.

Article 53(2) vests the supreme command of the Defence Forces of the Union in the President and says its exercise “shall be regulated by law.” Article 74(1) requires the President to “act in accordance with such advice” as the Council of Ministers, headed by the Prime Minister, gives. Under Article 75(3) that council is collectively responsible to the Lok Sabha, the House of the People. Article 74(2) says courts may not inquire into what advice Ministers gave the President. How the Union government works and how the President and Prime Minister work together cover those articles in practice.

None of the official texts on the nuclear chain quoted in this article mentions the President, and none cites an Act of Parliament as its basis. They present the arrangement as a decision of the CCS. Separately, the Joint Doctrine of the Indian Armed Forces, issued by Headquarters Integrated Defence Staff of the Ministry of Defence in 2017, says that command of the armed forces is vested in the President as Supreme Commander and that control of military power is exercised through the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers, with the Defence Minister holding specific responsibility.

The committee and the command around the two councils

The Joint Doctrine describes the CCS as the highest body at the apex level for decisions on all aspects of security. The Prime Minister chairs it, and it includes the Cabinet Ministers of Defence, Home, External Affairs and Finance. A Cabinet Secretariat order of May 2009 lists the same four ministerial posts and gives the committee’s functions as all defence issues, law and order and internal security, foreign policy with security implications, and economic and political issues affecting national security.

That handbook also describes a seven-member National Security Council chaired by the Prime Minister. Its Chief Executive is the National Security Adviser and, in the handbook’s words, the “primary advisor to the PM on National and international security affairs and strategic issues.” Service Chiefs sit on the Executive Council, the doctrine adds.

The Strategic Forces Command, it says, is “the NCA’s operational arm.” Its Commander-in-Chief reports to the Chiefs of Staff Committee and to the National Security Adviser, and the command “controls all of India’s nuclear warheads and delivery systems.” Its people come from the three Services, from civilian staff, from the Atomic Energy Commission and, as missile experts, from the Defence Research and Development Organisation. The civilian side of that atomic programme, built around the commission that Homi Bhabha led from 1948, is covered in the profile of Bhabha and the atomic programme.

A newer post sits beside the councils. On 24 December 2019 the Union Cabinet approved the post of Chief of Defence Staff, and the Press Information Bureau’s release lists among the officer’s functions: “Function as the Military Adviser to the Nuclear Command Authority.” That release adds that the Chief of Defence Staff “will not exercise any military command,” so as to give “impartial advice to the political leadership.” A written Rajya Sabha reply by the Minister of State for Defence on 3 February 2020 repeated the duty.

Three wordings of where the decision sits

The earliest text is the draft doctrine that the National Security Advisory Board, an advisory group, made public on 17 August 1999. Its section 5.1 reads: “The authority to release nuclear weapons for use resides in the person of the Prime Minister of India, or the designated successor(s).” Arms Control Today reported that the caretaker government had not formally approved the draft. India’s foreign minister, Jaswant Singh, told The Hindu in an interview published on 29 November 1999 that the board is a group of non-official experts and that the draft “is thus not a policy document of the government of India.”

The 2003 statement, a government document, gives the decision to a body rather than a person: the Political Council. The 2017 Joint Doctrine combines the two, saying the Political Council is “the only body empowered to take a decision on nuclear issues” and that the ultimate decision to authorize use “rests solely with the PM.” The handbook credits the National Security Advisory Board’s draft framework with laying out the command structure.

The three texts agree that release sits at the highest political level and with the Prime Minister’s council. They word differently whether the council as a body or the Prime Minister in person holds the decision, and none sets out how a decision is taken inside the Political Council. For the Political Council, the texts cited here name only its chair. For the Executive Council they add the Service Chiefs. The Political Council’s other members are not listed.

What the government has said since, and what it has not published

On 14 October 2004 the Prime Minister’s Office said that the NCA, under the Prime Minister’s chairmanship, had reviewed all aspects of India’s nuclear capabilities and taken stock of the command and control structures in place. The NCA approved measures to sustain India’s nuclear and missile capabilities within the principles of the doctrine.

On 5 November 2018 the Prime Minister’s Office said the submarine INS Arihant had returned from its first deterrence patrol, “completing the establishment of the country’s survivable nuclear triad.” India has “strict political control” under the NCA, the release said, and remains committed to credible minimum deterrence and no first use “as enshrined in the decision taken by the Cabinet Committee on Security” on 4 January 2003.

Several things are not in any of these documents. The 2003 statement and the Joint Doctrine both say alternate chains of command for retaliatory strikes exist, and neither says who is in them. Boyd noted in 2003 that it was unclear whether they were civilian or military. Launch procedures are not described. The 1999 draft said details of force structure, deployment and employment would be laid down separately and kept under constant review, and no such details have been issued in the documents cited here. M. V. Ramana and Lauren Borja wrote in August 2019 that no Indian government had officially released a new or updated nuclear doctrine since 2003.

When retaliation is authorised, and a 2019 remark

Who decides is a separate question from when. Under the 2003 statement, nuclear weapons will be used only in retaliation against a nuclear attack on Indian territory or on Indian forces anywhere. Retaliation to a first strike, it says, will be massive and designed to inflict unacceptable damage. The statement keeps the option of nuclear retaliation after a major biological or chemical attack on India or Indian forces anywhere. The Joint Doctrine lists credible deterrence, no first use, civilian authorization and a dispersed arsenal as the defining issues of nuclear command and control.

On 16 August 2019, at Pokhran, the Defence Minister said India’s nuclear policy had so far been no first use and that what happens in future would depend on circumstances, according to The Week. The magazine reported the remark as a hint that the policy might change. The 2003 statement remains the published text of the doctrine in the official documents cited here.

A 2007 agreement with Pakistan on weapon accidents

One official text on command and control is a treaty. India and Pakistan signed an agreement on reducing the risk from accidents relating to nuclear weapons at New Delhi on 21 February 2007. Its preamble recognises that both sides have “national measures including Command and Control structures” against such accidents. Article 2 requires each side to notify the other immediately of an accident that could cause radioactive fallout with adverse consequences for both or risk a nuclear war. Article 4 sends urgent information over the hotlines between the two Foreign Secretaries and between the Directors General of Military Operations.

Under Article 8 the agreement runs for five years and may be extended by agreement for successive five-year periods. Either side can withdraw on six months’ written notice.